The Emergence of Concentrated Ownership and the Rebalancing of Portfolios due to Shareholder Activism in a Financial Market Equilibrium* Consider a nancial market equilibrium with many rms and with risk averse investors holding diversied portfolios. Are there conditions under which these investors would forego some of the advantages of diversication, preferring instead a more concentrated ownership structure among themselves?
In this paper we show that when some of these investors have the ability to perform valueenhancing activities, and when this ability increases with ownership, optimizing behavior by all investors leads to a rebalancing of all market portfolios held by all market participants.
This occurs in the presence of complete information and is a consequence of Walrasian equilibrium mechanisms that include all investors. To obtain our results, we do not give prior power to an originating entrepreneur to assign large block holdings, we do not permit any shareholders a strategic role in price determination and we do not require liquidity or noise traders.
When the potential activist is known to be able to a¤ect only a single rm, we show that the rebalancing e¤ect implies an increase in concentration of ownership in that rm in the hands of that activist. We also show that the rebalancing e¤ect is accompanied by an increase in the price of the security that the activist can a¤ect, as well as in the total value of the market. When we study the problem of an potential activist who is able to a¤ect more than one rm, and we again nd that the rebalancing of all portfolios for all investors occurs. However, unlike the case when the potential activist can a¤ect only one rm, the activist may not acquire a concentration of ownership in all, or indeed any, of the rms that she might a¤ect. Nonetheless, prices change for all the rms that the activist can a¤ect, and we establish conditions under which some of these prices must increase. Since the activist alone is assumed to bear the costs of activism, a free-rider problem arises. We show that due to the prices established in the Walrasian equilibrium, this problem is partially mitigated.
We also model the problem of multiple activists in many rms. In this more complicated case, we show that rebalancing continues to occur in the portfolios of all investors, and concentration can occur for several activists. Gaming and other e¤ects make the results unpredictable and lead to excessive portfolio churning.
When we allow asymmetric information regarding the ability of the activist to a¤ect the performance of a single rm, concentration of ownership occurs, but it does not necessarily occur in the hands of the activist. We investigate the misallocations that may result from the rebalancing of the portfolios.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section I reviews the relevant literature and discusses the relationship of our model to this literature. We present our model of a single activist with the potential to a¤ect an arbitrary number of rms, and give its general solution, in Section II. In Section III we explore the impact of activism on ownership concentration. We show that it leads to the rebalancing of all portfolios of all market participants and that, consequently, no investors hold the market portfolio. In Section IV we study the impact of activism on equilibrium prices. We show that activism causes equilibrium prices to change, and derive the conditions for which these prices increase.
Then, we discuss the increase in the value of the market resulting from activism. The issue of free-ridership is analyzed in Section V, where we nd that equilibrium results in a sharing of the costs and benets of activism among all the market participants. We then extend our model to incorporate the possibility that an arbitrary number of activists have the potential to improve an arbitrary number of rms in Section VI, and derive the ownership structure and equilibrium prices in this setting. Asymmetric information concerning the abilities of the activist is modeled in Section VI, and its impact on ownership structure and equilibrium prices is studied. In Section VIII we present our summary and conclusions.
1 Discussion of the Literature Our paper builds on ideas developed and discussed in the literature relating to takeovers and to shareholder activism. In their seminal paper, Grossman and Hart (1980) study the conditions under which a tender o¤er might succeed, thereby leading to a concentration of ownership. They argue that corporate takeovers will not occur unless some means, e.g., dilution, can be devised to make the value of a share worth more to the raider than to an existing shareholder. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that an ownership structure containing a large shareholder is enough to induce increased takeover activity. However, starting from a di¤use ownership situation, they nd that only a type of asymmetric information would lead to a large shareholder. Both the Grossman and Hart and Shleifer and Vishny papers assume a structure in which risk neutral investors in a single rm face the prospect of selling their shares in a tender o¤er. Kyle and Vila (1991) continue to study takeovers in the context of a single rm and risk neutral investors and, in introducing noise traders, move the study of takeovers into a market equilibrium context. The equilibrium is one in which the informed trader has monopsonistic power, and acts strategically to maximize expected prots. Using the equilibrium concept of Kyle (1985) , Kyle and Vila show that, in an equilibrium with noise traders, neither dilution nor a large shareholder is needed to induce the informed trader to nd it protable to declare a takeover.
The focus on market equilibrium is maintained in the models of shareholder activism of Admati, Peiderer and Zechner (1994) , Maug (1998) , Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998) , although the denition of equilibrium employed di¤ers. Admati, Peiderer and Zechner place the question of the concentration of ownership in a market context with risk averse investors. They assume one risk averse large investor, a continuum of risk averse small investors and multiple securities. In their model, the large investor, who can alter the outcome of the rm, has strategic power enabling him to supply information concerning the future value of the rm to the continuum of small investors. These small investors, among themselves, use this information to determine the division of ownership between themselves and the large investor. Knowing this mechanism, the large investor chooses the optimum information to supply. As a result, Admati, Peiderer and Zechner nd that the large investor does not hold the market portfolio. Maug (1998) explicitly raises the question of the emergence of a large shareholder with the incentive to be active. He does so in the context of a model with a single rm and risk neutral investors. As in Admati, Peiderer, and Zechner, Maug allows the large shareholder to alter the ow of information to the marketplace for his own advantage. He posits liquidity traders and a market maker in a single rm, similar to Kyle and Vila, but then allows the large shareholder to optimize the size of his holdings. Maugs analysis focuses on the role of market liquidity in determining the concentration of ownership. Bolton and von Thadden (1998) also consider the problem of the emergence of a large active shareholder in the context of a single rm and risk neutrality.
The focus of their paper, as Maugs, is the role of liquidity and its relationship to ownership concentration. In the Bolton and von Thadden model, the owner of a rm distributes shares of that rm to a nite number of investors. In the next period, after observing the performance of the rm, these owners, together with a new group of investors, renegotiate their holdings in a bidding game. The value of the rm at this time depends on the ownership structure determined by the original owner. Bolton and von Thadden establish the conditions under which the original owner would choose to concentrate ownership in the hands of one investor, and relate this decision to the liquidity of the market. Emergence of ownership concentration is also a focus of Kahn and Winton (1998) , who study large shareholder intervention in the context of a single rm with risk neutral investors. Liquidity traders, large informed investors, and market makers participate in the equilibrium considered by Kahn and Winton. They explore the decision of a large owner who must choose whether to intervene and improve the performance of a rm or to sell its shares in the rm.
Related papers also include Huddard (1993) and Cuoco and Cvitanic (1998) . In Huddard activism is limited to the enforcement of an incentive contract on the manager. He examines the role of a risk averse active shareholder and a nite number of risk averse small investors in one security. In considering the balance between added return and added idiosyncratic risk, Huddard shows that a large monopsonistic shareholder will increase his holdings. Cuoco and Cvitanic examine an optimum consumption and investment problem in continuous time.
They assume the existence of a large investor who acts monoposonistically and whose portfolio choices have an impact on the expected returns of assets. By modeling the relationship between prices and the investments of the large shareholder, Cuoco and Cvitanic establish the existence of optimal consumption and investment policies.
Our model di¤ers from others in the literature in ve ways. First, by assuming that share demands are resolved by all participants in a Walrasian equilibrium, our analysis proceeds without either liquidity or noise traders or monopsonistic power on the part of the activist.
Second, we link the e¤ectiveness of an activist directly to the ownership she acquires in the equilibrium setting. Third, by examining a market for correlated securities when investors are risk averse, we are able to analyze the general portfolio impacts resulting from activism.
Fourth, we investigate the implications of allowing the investor or investors to be potential activists in more than one rm. Fifth, we allow for asymmetric information between the activist and the other investors.
In our model, we begin with an equilibrium in which all investors hold diversied portfolios, and focus on the subsequent emergence of a large shareholder and the consequences of this emergence on the other market participants, prices and holdings. We assume a nite number of risk averse investors, one (or several) of whom can inuence the random returns of rms by her (their) activism. All investors are seeking to invest in a nite number of rms which are assumed to be interdependent. We assume that the degree of success of an activist within a rm is monotonic in the amount of ownership acquired by that individual, and analyze the Walrasian equilibrium of such a system when all parties, including the activist, must compete for shares in the marketplace. We do not give the activist any strategic role in the determination of price. Through our analysis, we wish to derive conditions under which the marketplace would cede additional ownership to the activist investor.
Whereas our model attempts to answer some of the same questions concerning the emergence of large shareholders that Bolton and von Thadden, Maug, and Kahn and Winton address, our model is most closely related to that of Admati, Peiderer and Zechner (1994) .
Their model, as does ours, investigates the market implications of a risk averse activist in the context of risk averse investors maximizing end-of-period wealth. Our model di¤ers from theirs in that we do not give monopsonistic power to the activist as they do. Although they introduce the possibility that the return of securities might depend on ownership, they investigate what they call the case of an allocation-neutral monitoring technology in which an activists e¤ectiveness does not depend on ownership. We, on the other hand, assume in our model that the e¤ectiveness of the activist is related to her level of ownership. Also, we go beyond their results in analyzing the spillover e¤ect on portfolio holdings, as well as the equilibrium prices, resulting from activism.
The Model and its General Solution
We assume that there are M investors, F j ; j = 1; :::; M; each of whom has an exponential utility function u j ; with Pratt-Arrow coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion a j : Each investor F j is assumed to be a von-Neumann Morgenstern expected utility of end-of-period wealth maximizer. Our model considers three moments of time, t = 0, 1, and 2. At t = 0, the group of M risk averse investors, sharing common information about the future prospects of N risky interdependent rms at t = 2, vie for shares in those risky rms in a competitive market. At t = 1, three pieces of new information become known to all market participants:
(1) that some of the rms could benet from reorganization, (2) that one (or several) of the investors has a unique ability to a¤ect this reorganization and improve the performances of these rms, and (3) that the success in implementing these improvements is monotonic in the amount of ownership possessed by these skilled investors. With this new common information, all investors again vie for shares in the N rms in a competitive market. At t = 2, all random variables are realized and all rms are liquidated. By the phrase improve the performances of these rms, we have in mind that the particularly skilled investors can engage in value-enhancing activities relating to rm decision-making. When an investor is able to innovate and restructure a rm, we refer to that investor as being skilled, or more generally, as being an activist shareholder.
We now proceed to examine each of these moments of time in more detail. At t = 0, each F j invests in a portfolio of N risky securities as well as in the risk-free asset. Having allowed the possibility that rms might benet from reorganization at t = 1, we assume at t = 0 that each F j takes into account the possibility of intervening events at t = 1. These intervening events might lead to unanticipated improvements in the performances of the rms or to unanticipated deteriorations in those performances. As a result, we assume that at t = 0 each F j cannot specify the precise expected value of each security, but must instead consider each expected value as a random variable. Thus, the random price per share of the risky securities at t = 2, as perceived by all investors at t = 0, is assumed to be given by the n £1 " ¿ is normally distributed with mean 0, non-singular covariance matrix ¿ , and is independent of B " 0 . In summary, all investors assume that the random price per share of the risky securities at t = 2, as perceived at t = 0, is normally distributed with mean vector ¹ 0 and covariance matrix 0 = + ¿ where ¿ describes the additional uncertainty due to the inability of investors to forecast precisely the rms expected values. We assume that the rate of return of the risk-free asset is 0 and we permit investors to borrow and lend at this rate. Having started with initial wealth h j0 ; and taking the n £ 1 price vector P as given, F j seeks to determine x ¤ j0 , the n £ 1 vector of shares in each of the risky assets, and z j0 , the amount borrowed or lent for these purchases. The
subject to z j0 + x j0 P = h j0 where Eu j is the expected utility of F j : An equilibrium n £ 1 price vector P 0 yields the demands x ¤ j0 so that all shares are sold, i.e., 2 M j=1 x ¤ j0 = Q where Q, with elements q i , is the n £ 1 vector of the total number of shares in each of the N risky rms.
The situation at t = 0 just described is the classical formulation whose solution is wellknown. We present this result without proof in Proposition 1. Using the notation s = 2 M j=1 1 a j and°j = a j s ; we have the following result.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium at t = 0, investor F j ; j = 1; :::; M; acquires a xed proportion of ownership in each of the N risky rms. The price paid for this acquisition is the expected price per share at t = 2, corrected by a risk premium. More precisely, the unique equilibrium solution is given by x ¤ j =°jQ and P = ¹ ¡ s Q; where = + ¿ :
As a result of Proposition 1, at t = 0, all investors are participants in the market and each holds the market portfolio. Assuming that the mean vector is normally distributed is a convenience permitting us to establish a familiar benchmark against which to compare holdings at t = 1. Our development could have proceeded without this assumption by comparing the holdings at t = 1 to arbitrary initial holdings. However, we chose this familiar benchmark to emphasize the process by which a concentration of ownership might arise in equilibrium from a group of well-diversied investors.
At t = 1, new information becomes available to all F j : This new information is that one or more of the rms could benet from reorganization, that one investor, F , has the skill to restructure the rm or rms so as to improve their performances, and the degree to which F will be successful in this endeavor depends on the number of shares that she will own at t = 1 in these rms. Consequently, at t = 1, all investors update their appraisals of the price per
where ¹ is the n £ 1 mean vector absent any further intervention by F and ¹(x ); an n £ 1 vector, is the incremental improvement based on F owning x shares of the N securities at t = 1. The random vector B
" is normally distributed with mean 0 and non-singular covariance matrix and is assumed to be independent of B " and B
" ¿ : With this new information, each F j adjusts her portfolio holdings as follows. Starting this period with wealth h j1 ; and taking prices P as given, F j seeks to determine x ¤ j1 , the n £ 1 vector of shares in each of the risky assets and z j1 , the amount borrowed or lent for these purchases. The x
An equilibrium price vector at t = 1, P 1 ; yields the demands x ¤ j1 so that all shares are sold, i.e.,
The relationships of the parameters ¹ 1 and 1 to the parameters ¹ 0 and 0 will be addressed below. The case of more than one activist will also be explored later.
We now investigate the response of the investors to the presence of an activist, F 1 ; who has the skill to a¤ect f rms, which are assumed to be rms 1 through f:
We assume in what follows that the n £ 1 vector of improvements or innovations ¹(x 11 ) = Dx 11 where D is a diagonal n £ n matrix whose positive diagonal elements d i ; i = 1; :::; f; represent the incremental improvement per share that F 1 can generate in rm i: The remaining diagonal elements of D are zero. Also, let C be an n £ n diagonal matrix whose positive entries c i ; i = 1; :::; f; represent the cost per share of the improvements in rm i: The remaining diagonal elements of C are zero. We assume that these costs, which are borne entirely by F 1 ; are known only to F 1 ; whereas D is known to all market participants. We next show that this information causes trading to take place at t = 1 and, as a result, no investor holds the market portfolio. In what follows, we let s ¡1 = s ¡ 1 a :
Proposition 2 The General Solution. In equilibrium at t = 1, investor F j ; j = 1; :::; M;
in general, acquires a di¤erent proportion of ownership in each of the N risky rms. The price paid for each rms shares is the expected price per share at t = 2 corrected by a risk premium which depends on the impact of the activist. More precisely, if a ¡ (D ¡ C) is a positive denite matrix, then the unique equilibrium solution is given by
Proof. See Appendix.
Comparing the results of Proposition 2 to those of Proposition 1, we see that, in general, all of the holdings of all the F j change simultaneously. Importantly, at t = 1, no investor holds the market portfolio. The equations x ¤ j dening the holdings of F j ; j > 1; have the same form as those of Admati, Peiderer and Zechner; however, the argument by which their results were derived is entirely di¤erent from ours. Whereas Admati, Peiderer and
Zechner allow the activist to choose his holdings as a monopsonist, in our model all investors are price takers and x ¤ ; the vector of the holdings of the activist at t = 1, is determined simultaneously with all other holdings.
In our model, we place the impact of activism in the mean of the distribution of future prices, i.e., ¹(x ) = Dx : However, as can be seen in the proof of Proposition 2, our approach to modeling activism is equivalent to assuming that the covariance matrix is reduced by the amount D as a consequence of F s involvement. Therefore, without much additional e¤ort, we could have modeled the impact of F on both the mean and the covariance matrix without substantially changing the results.
We now present the explicit solutions to the equations in Proposition 2 and examine their consequences. We use the following notation. Let ( 
At optimality each investors holdings in all securities change. We call the changes in the portfolios of F j ; j = 1; :::; M; resulting from activism the rebalancing e¤ect. If we think of the elements of Q (properly normalized) as the coe¢cients of a market portfolio and if we think of the elements (! ; :::; ! f )k (properly normalized) as a rebalancing portfolio, then the solution given in Proposition 3 states that, at optimality, all participants hold di¤erent mixtures of the two risky portfolios.
In the special case when rms performances are independent of one another, the solution in Proposition 3 simplies: no changes in holdings occur in rms other than in those in which F is a potential activist and, given our assumptions, F acquires additional ownership in all the f rms when all d i ¡ 2c i > 0. When independence does not hold, neither of these two simplications can be made. In general, rebalancing involves the entire portfolio. The circumstances under which F acquires greater ownership in all, some, or none of the the f rms is dealt with below.
We now show that when F is capable of being an activist only in rm 1; F always acquires more ownership in that rm. When F is a potential activist in rms 1 and 2; the change in holdings for F is k ! + k ! where k E are the elements of the vector k in Proposition 3; the Rebalancing Result.
When we examine the implied change in F s holdings in both of these rms, we no longer have the guarantee that an increase in holdings will occur in both rms. This follows from the fact that, since is positive denite, the i JD element of ! E is positive, but all other elements in this vector may be of either sign. Thus, the change in holdings for F depends on two opposing forces, one that yields F more shares because of skill, and the other that yields F less shares due to diversication issues. This tension, which we see for the case f = 2; is intensied in the general case of arbitrary f: We call the result of these opposing forces the confounding e¤ect. The conditions that yield F greater ownership in at least one of the rms in which she is a potential activist are given next. To illustrate Corollary 2, one can imagine an activist whose skill is applicable to all of the rms in a particular industry. If that industry happens to be uncorrelated, or only slightly correlated, with the other rms in the market, then at optimality a concentration of ownership will accrue to the activist in at least one of those rms in the industry in which the activist is skilled, but not necessarily in all of the rms in that industry. Since it is reasonable to assume that the rms within the industry are highly correlated, then risk considerations keep the activist from getting a concentration of ownership in all the rms of that industry. In fact, in this situation the activist will sell some of the shares in rms in which she has the skill to improve the performance.
Another illustration, albeit rather extreme, is one in which the activists skill is applicable to all f = N rms. Here, by default, f;N ¡f = 0; and we again nd a concentration of ownership in at least one rm and the possibility of selling shares in others.
We now turn our attention to the impact of activism on security prices.
The Impact of Activism on Prices
Proposition 5 Equilibrium Prices. When F is a potential activist in f rms, then at t = 1, the equilibrium prices of securities 1 through f change and the prices of the other securities may also change. More precisely, we have
To interpret this general result on equilibrium prices, we must relate the parameters at t = 1 to those at t = 0. We assume in what follows that ¹ = ¹ ; which implies that activism provides an incremental improvement over the initial parameter values. We now consider two ways in which uncertainty at t = 1 relates to uncertainty at t = 0. First, for comparative purposes we consider that uncertainty has remained unchanged, i.e., = :
Second, we assume that part of the uncertainty that existed at t = 0 has been resolved at t = 1. Since we assumed that = + ¿ where ¿ represented the uncertainty in specifying an appropriate mean vector, we assume = : Using these specications we have the following corollaries. Proof. See Appendix.
We assumed that ¹ = ¹ and that = in order to compare the equilibrium prices at t = 0 and t = 1. Corollary 3 states that the share prices of the f rms change at t=1, whereas the prices of all the other securities remains unchanged. Nonetheless, given the rebalancing e¤ect described above, the other investors take prots on at least one of the rst f rms and rearrange their holdings in all the other rms for diversication purposes.
We note that the rearrangement of shares in securities other than the rst f takes place at neither a prot nor a loss for all investors since prices do not change for these securities. On the other hand, F incurs the cost (P ¡P ) (x ¤ ¡°Q) for additional shares, thereby taking on additional risk with a prospect of additional return. As a consequence of the rebalancing, none of the F j holds the market portfolio at t = 1.
Corollary 4 If ¹ = ¹ and the uncertainty at t = 1 has decreased, i.e., = ; then all security prices change and at least one of the rst f security prices increases. More precisely,
we have if ¹ = ¹ and that = then
and at least one element of
The risk premium is dened to be ¹ E ¡P E ; i = 0; 1: At t = 0, ¹ ¡P has the familiar form, which can be interpreted as the covariance of the rms share prices with the market. At t = 1, in the context of an activist shareholder, this simple interpretation is no longer valid. The change in risk premia from t = 0 to t = 1 when ¹ = ¹ is P ¡P : Thus, the previous two corollaries can be interpreted as the change in risk premia due to the potential intervention of an activist and the possible reduction of uncertainty. As the corollaries demonstrate, this change does not depend entirely on the covariance structure since the term describing the impact of activism does not have this form. Therefore, the risk premium at t = 1 also does not have this form.
The case when F is a potential activist only in one rm, f = 1; yields the following unambiguous result. We let e i be the n £ 1 vector whose i th element is 1 and whose other elements are zero.
Corollary 5 Under the conditions of Corollary 3, at t = 1, when F is a potential activist only in rm 1; then at optimality the share price of rm 1 increases. More precisely, we
As a consequence of the optimality in our model, Corollary 5 shows that at t = 1, when F is an activist only in rm 1; F acquires additional shares in that rm even though the price of those shares increases. Obviously this increase in shares both increases F s risk and also her potential for gain. This result di¤ers from the point made in the literature, by, for example, Admati, Peiderer and Zechner, Maug, and Kahn and Winton, that F can only make a prot on the shares purchased at t = 0 since the prices of shares at t = 1 will have risen to absorb all of the potential benet from F s activism.
When some of the uncertainty is resolved at t = 1, all prices change as a result of this resolution and at least one of the rst f prices increases due to activism. Importantly, we can use these results to evaluate the overall impact of activism on the market. The quantity Q (P ¡P ) represents the change in the total value of the market. By Corollary 4, this
Since ¿ is positive denite, the rst term is positive and, as was shown in the proof of Corollary 5, when F is an activist in only rm 1, then the second term is positive. Thus, in this case we can interprete the overall increase in market value as being due to two sources: the reduction of uncertainty and the impact of activism. We summarize these remarks in the following corollary.
Corollary 6 Under the conditions of Corollary 4, and if F is an activist in only rm 1, the potential for activism always produces an increase in the value of the market.
When F is a potential activist in more than one rm, it is possible that the term
k may be negative. If this term were negative, it would imply that the total value of the market could decline in the presence of this activist.
A Note on Free-Ridership
We assumed in the model above that the potential activist bore the entire costs of her activism. As such, all other investors derived the benets of activism without paying for them, creating a free-rider problem. We show in the next proposition that the free rides are not so free. Proof. See Appendix.
When F is a potential investor only in rm 1, it was established above that, at optimality, her holdings in the rst rm increase. The additional shares were sold to F by the other investors at the price of e P per share. Therefore, as c increases, the prot per share of the other investors decreases and these other investors indirectly bear some of the private costs that F incurs for her activism. On the other hand, although F pays c ; she recoups part of this cost by paying less for each additional share acquired in rm 1. This feature mitigates the free-rider problem to some extent.
Multiple Activists in Many Firms
So far we have considered the case of a single activist. This is the same assumption employed by the authors of the studies we discussed above. Above, we have generalized these other studies by considering activism in several rms. Now, now consider the further case in which multiple activists might a¤ect the same rms at the same time.
The assumption of multiple activists raises two new issues. One of these issues is the game-theoretic one. This involves the determination of coalitions that might evolve within the rm, as well as the degree of power each activist might have. The second, which builds on the rst, is the ways in which the resulting power structure might have an impact on the value of the rm. While we do not deal with the rst of these in this paper, we abstract the gaming considerations by assuming that the results yield a known ranking of power among activists. On the second issue, we assume that the impact on holdings and prices is a¤ected by each activist in proportion both to the shares acquired in equilibrium and to the index of coalitional strength. For some results on the formation of coalitions within a rm see Zwiebel (1995) and Fluck (1999) .
We let D j ; j = 1; :::; M be an n £ n diagonal matrix whose elements are non-negative.
The i th diagonal element represents the per share contribution (strength) that potential activist j may exert on rm i. With this notation that allows all elements of D j to be zero, all investors are potential activists. Let C j be an n £ n diagonal matrix whose nonnegative i th diagonal element represents the cost per share that F j bears when she is active in rm i. We assume that these costs are borne entirely by F j : Whereas D j is known to all investors, C j is known to F j alone. We let ¢ j = D j ¡ 2C j : We now model the impact of multiple activist on prices. We assume that at t = 1, B ¹ = ¹ +¹(x ; x 21 ; :::; x M1 )+ B " 1 where ¹(x 11 ; x 21 ; :::;
" 1 is a random vector whose distribution is normal with zero mean, covariance matrix 1 and is independent of B " 0 : As before, the optimization at
the equilibrium price vector P 1 :
Proposition 7 The General Solution with Multiple Activists. In equilibrium at t = 1 with M potential activists, each investor F j , j = 1; :::; M; in general acquires a different proportion of ownership in each of the N risky rms. That is, at optimality, some potential activists sell shares to other potential activists. The price paid for each rms shares is the expected price per share at t = 2 corrected by a risk premium that depends on the impact of all the activists. More precisely, if we let [a j ¡ ¢ j ] be a positive denite matrix for each j; j = 1; :::; M; then the unique equilibrium solution is given by
Examination of the optimal holdings equation x ¤ j shows that when the ¢ j are di¤erent, the corresponding investors hold entirely di¤erent portfolios. Since each investor was initially holding the market portfolio, it follows that some potential activists sold at optimality, while others acquired larger holdings. Which potential activists sold, and which acquired more, depends on a complicated relationship of relative benets, relative costs, and attitudes towards risk. Without information on these characteristics, it is hard to predict which activists will acquire a concentration of ownership. This lack of predictability is added to the lack of predictability due to the confounding e¤ect described above, which is also present here.
Prices, too, su¤er from the lack of predictability since the risk premium also depends on the relative benets, relative costs, and attitudes towards risk. Since costs are assumed to be known only by the parties that expend them, it seems unlikely that the risk premium could be evaluated, suggesting that, in practice, the uncertainty of prices would increase.
7 Asymmetric information concerning the activism of F in Firm 1.
So far we have assumed that all investors correctly perceive that F has the skill to improve performance. We now introduce the idea of uncertainty regarding the activists skills.
Specically, we investigate the situation in which F j ; j > 1; is unsure about the ability of F and assigns probability¸to the event that F has such skill, and probability (1 ¡¸) otherwise. We will compare three equilibria under these conditions, corresponding to the cases (a) F has the skill, (b) F does not have the skill and (c) the rational expectations case in which F is drawn from a distribution such that the probability that F has the skill is, in fact,¸: We refer to the holdings in these three cases as x ¤ (D); x ¤ (0); x ¤ (¸); respectively.
Throughout this section, we employ the assumption that F s special skill pertains only to rm 1: Proof. See Appendix.
When either F has the skill to improve the performance of the rm, or if the other market participants correctly assess the probability that F has this skill, then the optimum solution yields a concentration of ownership in the hands of F : Of course, this concentration is less than in the absence of asymmetric information. However, when F does not have the skill, a concentration of ownership still occurs but in the wrong hands. All investors but F acquire additional shares in rm 1. At the same time, all investors rebalance their portfolios so that when ¹(x ) = 0 we have the extreme e¤ect that all market participants take an additional risk with no promise of additional return.
We now address the equilibrium prices under the various assumptions. Let P (D); P (0);
and P (¸) be the equilibrium vectors corresponding to the three assumptions about F :
Proposition 9 Under the assumptions of Proposition 7, at t = 1, the equilibrium price of security 1 changes regardless of whether F has the skill to be an activist or not. All other equilibrium prices remain unchanged. If ¹ = ¹ and = ; then at t = 1, the equilibrium price of security 1 increases regardless of whether F has the skill to be an activist or not.
More precisely, under the conditions of Proposition 7 and if ¹ = ¹ and if = , there exist constants K D > 0; K¸> 0; K > 0 such that a:
Since these solutions are simultaneous solutions for all F j ; F cannot, as in other models, take advantage of the knowledge of her own situation. Nonetheless, there are benets to F :
In case (a), F acquires additional shares in rm 1, albeit not as many as in the complete information case and the demand for these additional shares increases the share price. In case (b), F also acquires additional shares and, although her demand is lower for these shares, it is still su¢cient to increase the price per share. In case (c), where F would have been content to stay with her initial holdings°Q; the other investors mistakenly increase their demands for shares in rm 1, thereby again increasing the price per share.
In this paper we investigate the impact of activism on the market for correlated securities when investors are risk averse. When the activist is known to be able to have an impact on only one rm, f = 1; we show that in a Walrasian equilibrium context which includes the activist, the activist acquires a concentration of ownership in that rm. This concentration of ownership arises from a market whose participants hold diversied portfolios. By yielding more ownership to the activist, all investors alter the risk proles of their holdings, ending with less balanced portfolios. This rebalancing e¤ect is accompanied by an increase in both the price of the security that the activist can a¤ect, as well as in the total value of the market. Unlike other explanations for the concentration of ownership, our explanation only requires that all investors are price takers who are aware of the existence of the activist and that the e¤ectiveness of activism depends on the degree of ownership concentration.
In the case when the activist has the potential to have an impact on more than one rm, f > 1; again we nd that the rebalancing of portfolios for all investors occurs. However, unlike the case when f = 1; the activist may not acquire a concentration of ownership in all the rms that she might a¤ect or indeed any concentration in those rms. For the special case in which the f rms are not too correlated with the other rms in the market, we
show that the activist increases her holdings in at least one of the f rms. We discuss the circumstances leading the activist with the skill to improve several rms to increase her holdings, at optimality, in only a subset of these f , while decreasing her holdings in the others.
In a market with correlated securities and with a potential activist shareholder present, we show that concentration of ownership arises as a natural consequence of the individual optimizations of all of the risk averse investors. Proving that concentration arises endogenously in a complete information Walrasian equilibrium in which all investors including the activist are price takers is a major contribution of our paper and di¤erentiates our results from those in the literature. Another nding is that the existence of a potential activist causes all investors at optimality to rebalance their portfolios.
Prices also change as a consequence of the presence of a potential activist: if the activist can improve f rms, we nd that the prices of the securities of all the f rms change while the prices of the remaining securities may also change. We establish the conditions under which at least one of the security prices of the f rms must increase, and in the special case in which f = 1, we show that the price of the corresponding security must increase.
Having established the conditions under which the presence of an activist leads to an increase in concentration in the hands of that activist and to an increase in the price of at least one of the securities in which the activist can improve performance, we have also shown that the total market value of all the securities has risen as a consequence of the activist.
However, the source of this increase in market value is the rebalancing of all portfolios that occurs at optimality in the presence of an activist. Transaction and other costs associated with this churning are ignored in our model and thus it is impossible for us to draw the conclusion that an increase in the value of the market is benecial in a more general context.
Within our model, of course, the rebalancing is an optimal response to the presence of the acitivist.
Usual discussions assert that equilibrium price increases fully reect the benets associated with the improvements that the activist can make. These discussions conclude that the activist cannot make a prot on new shares purchased as the other investors will have anticipated the activists improvments and will have bid up the price accordingly. We nd a somewhat di¤erent result. Since at optimality we can establish the conditions under which the activist will acquire additional shares of the rm or rms she can improve, the new holdings must be associated with an increase in the expected utility of the activist. Thus, some gain from the purchase of additional shares must accrue to the activist under these conditions.
Since only the activist pays the cost of activism, a free-rider problem arises. But, we nd that an increase in the activists costs is associated with a decrease in the equilibrium price of the security. This means that for larger costs incurred by the activist, the price that the activist must pay to acquire additional shares is lower. On the other side of the trade, however, the other investors receive a lower price for the shares that at optimality they choose to sell. Thus, in equilibrium, the costs of activism are shared in some manner by all investors and not solely borne by the activist. We interprete this result as mitigating the free-rider problem to some extent.
When we consider many potential activists, our results show that, beside the usual rebalancing, concentration of ownership could occur for several activists. Unlike the situation where only a single activist is present, the confounding e¤ect and additional gaming e¤ects become more important with multiple activists. These, in turn, lead to unpredictable results and excessive churning.
When we broaden our model to include the impact of asymmetric information concerning activism, we again nd the rebalancing e¤ect. But here we show that concentration of ownership may fall into the wrong hands.
The balance sheet on activism has both positive and negative entries. The positive entry is that we can show that the presence of an activist increases the total value of the market.
The negative entries concern the rebalancing or churning that is generated by activism, as well as the results of what we call the confounding e¤ect. This latter e¤ect follows from the relationship between the risk characteristics of the activist and the covariance structure between the rms she can improve and those she cannot a¤ect. Because of correlations between the share prices of these two groups of rms, the activist may nd it optimal to sell shares in rms that she could have improved.
Although we have studied a two period model, we might speculate as to the after e¤ects of activism. Suppose we imagine that at t = 2 the activist improves the performances of the rms in which she has acquired additional ownership at t = 1. Having completed these improvements at t = 2, all investors know that the activist can make no additional improvements. Thus if all investors were now at t= 2, speculating about t = 3, there would be no thought of a potential activist and the problems facing the investors would be the same as those at t = 0. Thus the equilibirum prices at t = 2 would revert to those of t = 0 and all investors would rebalance their portfolios again and at optimality would once again hold the market portfolio. Thus, the impact of activism would have been to cause an initial rebalancing in portfolios as investors moved from holding the market portfolio to their optimal portfolio in the presence of activism, only to be followed by another round of rebalancing after the activist had in fact improved the rm and investors once again found it optimal to hold the market portfolio. Prices also would be a¤ected, going up at t = 1 and then down again at t = 2. This zigzag pattern of prices, accompanied by a pattern of the resulting buying and selling, would be the anticipated course of events in the presence of activism.
Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 2.
We can replace the expected utility by its certainty equivalent and since, by assumption, B
¹ is normally distributed and u j is exponential with parameter a j ; it follows
The rst-order conditions are ¹ + Dx ¡ P = 2a j x j : Dividing by a j and summing over j; j > 1;
Cx = h +°Q P : Substituting, as above, and again using the certainty equivalent,
The rst-order conditions are Finally, from the equation resulting from summing over the rst-order conditions for F j ;
Since it is assumed that a 1 1 ¡ (D ¡ C) is positive denite, it follows that all the objective functions of investors are concave, making the solution of the rst-order conditions the unique equilibrium solution. | For 1 non-singular, it is easily checked that 
Proof of Corollary 1
From Proposition 3, we have 
I f ] are positive, since d i ¡ 2c i are assumed positive and therefore was shown to be positive denite, so is its inverse. Using the explicit form of the inverse given in Proposition 3, it follows that
with a positive denite matrix which must be positive. This contradiction implies that at
Proof of Corollary 4
This proof is the same as the one for Corollary 3.
Proof of Corollary 5
Since we showed in Corollary 3 that at least one of the f prices increases, when f = 1; it follows that the rst price increases and thus e 0 (P ¡P ) > 0: |
Proof of Proposition 6
It follows from Proposition 5 that
Writing the rst element of P in terms of c ; we have for f = 1;
Since s ¡ s < 1; the numerator of the last bracketed expression is decreasing in c 1 : Since ! 1 1 ; the rst element of ! 1 ; is positive, the coe¢cient of c 1 in the denominator is positive and thus the denominator is increasing. Thus, the bracketed expression is decreasing in c 1 : |
Proof of Proposition 7
Each investor other than F 1 believes that F 1 is e¤ective, i.e., ¹(x 11 ) = Dx 11 ; with probability and not e¤ective, ¹(x 11 ) = 0; with probability (1 ¡¸): Thus, each investor F j; j > 1; seeks
Since this is the same as was worked out in the proof of Proposition 2 with D replaced by¸D; summing over j; j > 1; implies that x The rst element of ! 1 ; i.e., ! Substituting these values into the rst order conditions for F j ; and solving for ¹ 1 ¡ P 1
we have ¹ 1 ¡ P 1 = 2(a j 1 ¡ 
